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Abstract
It is known that there are school choice problems without an e cient and stable
assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing
their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or comparing their sets of blocking students
who are involved in at least one blocking pair. Although there always exists a Pareto
improvement over the student-optimal stable (DA) assignment which is minimally un-
stable among e cient assignments when the stability comparison is based on comparing
the sets of blocking pairs in the set-inclusion sense, we show that this is not necessarily
true when the stability comparison is based on comparing the sets of blocking pairs in
the cardinal sense, or when it is based on comparing sets of blocking students (in the
set-inclusion or cardinal sense). Given the latter impossibilities, we characterize the
priority profiles where there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism which
is cardinally minimally stable among e cient assignments when counting blocking pairs
or counting blocking students. The resulting domain restrictions suggest to take with
caution school choice analysis which relies on a particular stability comparison method.
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A school choice problem consists of a set of students and a set of schools such that each
student has a preference ordering over schools, and each school has a capacity and a priority
ordering over students. How to assign students to schools in a desirable way turns out to be
a nontrivial question, which has led to an extensive school choice literature starting with the
seminal study by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003).
A clear indication that school choice problems are nontrivial is the incompatibility of
(Pareto) e ciency and stability—two natural and desirable properties. An assignment is
e cient if there is no other assignment at which a student is better o↵ while no student
is worse o↵. An assignment is stable if it does not involve a “blocking pair” of a student
and a school such that the student prefers the school to his assigned school and he has a
higher priority than another student who is assigned to that school. Although an e cient
assignment can always be found, for example, by a serial dictatorship algorithm (Svensson,
1999), and a stable assignment can always be found, for example, by the deferred acceptance
algorithm (DA) (Gale and Shapley, 1962), unfortunately, there exist school choice problems
without an assignment that is both e cient and stable (Roth, 1982).
In this paper, we insist on e ciency and investigate assignments which are minimally
unstable among e cient assignments: such assignments are e cient and there is no other
e cient assignment which is more stable. To formulate what it means to be more stable, we
consider comparing assignments by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs
or comparing their sets of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair.
According to the first method, an assignment is more stable than another assignment if the
set of blocking pairs in the former is a proper subset of the set of blocking pairs in the latter
assignment. This method has a corresponding cardinal version such that an assignment
is cardinally more stable than another assignment if the number of blocking pairs in the
former is less than the number of blocking pairs in the latter assignment.1 According to the
second method, an assignment is blocking-student–wise (BS-wise) more stable than another
assignment if the set of blocking students in the former is a proper subset of the set of
blocking students in the latter assignment. This method also has a corresponding cardinal
version such that an assignment is BS-wise cardinally more stable than another assignment if
the number of blocking students in the former is less than the number of blocking students
in the latter assignment.
Stability has been a central desirable property in school choice, both in theory and in
1Clearly, if an assignment is more stable than another assignment, than it is also cardinally more stable.
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applications, especially because a student who is involved in a blocking pair is being treated
unfairly which makes the assignment open to criticism on fairness grounds, and even on
legal grounds since the student may pursue legal action against the school district. Although
stability and e ciency are not always compatible, the DA mechanism always chooses the
student-optimal stable assignment, which is a reasonable solution if stability concerns come
first and e ciency second. If e ciency concerns come first and instability is inevitable,
comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking pairs or
blocking students, both in set-inclusion and cardinal ways, are all reasonable methods.2
The e ciency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADA) due to Kesten (2010),
which Pareto improves over the DA mechanism, turns out to be minimally unstable among
e cient assignments, i.e., at each problem, it produces an assignment that is minimally
unstable among e cient assignments.3 However, we show that EADA is not cardinally
minimally unstable among e cient assignments. Even more, there is no mechanism which
Pareto improves over DA and which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assign-
ments (Proposition 2). It turns out that there is no implication relation between any of the
blocking–student-wise notions and any of the blocking–pair-wise notions. More interestingly,
the EADA mechanism is not BS-wise minimally unstable among e cient assignments, and
therefore also not BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments. Even
more, there is no mechanism which Pareto improves over DA and which is BS-wise (cardinally)
minimally unstable among e cient assignments (Proposition 1).
Above results suggest that the EADA mechanism’s failure of cardinal minimal instability
while satisfying minimal instability cannot be solely attributed to the cardinal feature of the
comparison method. We also show that there exist priority profiles for which the EADA
mechanism is BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable but not necessarily cardinally minimally
unstable, and whenever the EADA mechanism is cardinally minimally unstable, then it is
BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable. Thus, the conclusions are opposite for the inclusion
comparison and the cardinality comparison (of blocking pairs and blocking students). All
these results suggest that several conclusions related to minimal instability are sensitive to
the choice of the stability comparison method.4
We also investigate restricting the domain of priority profiles. For the unit-capacity case,
we characterize the priority profiles for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA
2Ehlers and Morrill (2020) provide a thorough analysis of legal assignments in school choice.
3This result is also proven in Tang and Zhang (2020). We present our proof which is independent and
di↵erent.
4Not all conclusions have to be sensitive, however. In Doğan and Ehlers (2020), we show that a result by
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020), which relies on a particular stability comparison method, is in fact robust to
the choice of the stability comparison method.
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assignment which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments (Theorem
1).5 Our characterization result provides two important insights.
1. For any priority profile for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA
assignment that is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments, the DA
assignment always includes at most one improvement cycle6 and there is a unique
e cient Pareto improvement over the DA assignment. This result suggests that such
priority profiles are quite restricted. In other words, if one restricts himself to Pareto
improvements over the DA mechanism, it is essentially impossible to guarantee an
assignment that is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
2. Our characterization result fully uncovers the three potential reasons why the EADA
assignment may fail to be cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
Each potential reason corresponds to the violation of one of the three conditions in
Theorem 1.
Also, for the unit-capacity case, we characterize the priority profiles for which there exists
a Pareto improvement over the DA assignment which is BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable
among e cient assignments (Theorem 2), which results in similar insights as above: For
any “possibility priority profile”, there is a unique e cient Pareto improvement over the DA
assignment, which includes exactly one blocking student; and our characterization result
again fully uncovers all potential reasons why the EADA assignment fails.
2 Related Literature
Ergin (2002) derived necessary and su cient conditions (on the capacity-priority profile) for
the e ciency of the DA mechanism. The EADA mechanism (Kesten, 2010) is e cient7 but not
necessarily cardinally minimally unstable when counting blocking pairs or counting blocking
students. Here we asked a parallel question to Ergin (2002): when is the EADA-mechanism
cardinally minimally unstable?
Our methods to compare assignments by their stability are inspired by comparison methods
in recent studies (here, we provide a non-exhaustive list). In Pathak and Sönmez (2013),
5The characterizing conditions are still necessary conditions for the EADA assignment to be cardinally
minimally unstable among e cient assignments in the general multi-capacity case (Appendix A.2), and
therefore the main insights extend to the general setup.
6See Section 4 for a definition of an improvement cycle
7Doğan and Yenmez (2020), Dur et al. (2019), Ehlers and Morrill (2020), Kwon and Shorrer (2019), Tang
and Zhang (2020), and Troyan et al. (2020) provide di↵erent other justifications for EADA.
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school choice mechanisms are compared in terms of their manipulability by comparing the
sets of problems, in the set inclusion sense, at which they are manipulable. In Andersson et
al. (2014), resource allocation mechanisms (in the model of allocating objects with monetary
transfers) are compared also in terms of their manipulability, but by comparing cardinalities
of the sets of problems at which they are manipulable. Similar comparison methods have
been used to compare manipulability of social choice functions (Maus et al., 2007b,a). In
Doğan et al. (2018), probabilistic assignments are compared in terms of their e ciency by
comparing the sets of consistent utility profiles, in the set inclusion sense, at which they are
ex-ante e cient. Although our study uses similar comparison methods, we depart from these
studies by focusing on stability.
The closest studies to ours are Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020),8 Kwon and Shorrer (2019), and
Tang and Zhang (2020), which also compare school choice mechanisms, and assignments, in
terms of their stability. Although these studies also consider minimally unstable assignments,
to our knowledge, our study is the first to consider cardinally minimally unstable assignments
in school choice.
Tang and Zhang (2020) introduce the notion of self-constrained optimality for assignments,
which requires that the assignment Pareto dominates any other assignment that is more
stable, and show that the EADA assignment is self-constrained optimal at each problem.
This result also implies that the EADA mechanism is minimally unstable among e cient
assignments. Kwon and Shorrer (2019) introduce the notion of a blocking triplet which
includes, in addition to a blocking pair, a student who violates the priority of the student in
the blocking pair. Kwon and Shorrer (2019) show that the EADA mechanism is minimally
unstable among e cient assignments also when stability comparison is based on comparing
(in the set-inclusion sense) sets of blocking triplets. Di↵erent from Tang and Zhang (2020) and
Kwon and Shorrer (2019), we also study cardinally minimally unstable e cient assignments
and in particular show that the EADA mechanism may fail to choose such an assignment.
Moreover, we also consider two alternative methods to compare assignments by their stability,
based on comparing sets of blocking students (the set of students who are involved in at least
one blocking pair) instead of blocking pairs or blocking triplets.
In another recent study, Combe et al. (2017) consider a teacher assignment problem where
each teacher is initially endowed with a position at a school, and individual rationality and
stability are incompatible. Combe et al. (2017) also compare assignments in terms of their
stability by comparing the sets of blocking pairs in the set inclusion sense.
8We say more about Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020) in Section 6.
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3 Model
Let N denote a finite set of students and C denote a finite set of schools. Each student i 2 N
has a preference ordering Ri over C [ {;},9 where ; represents an outside option for the
student. The strict part of the preference ordering Ri is denoted by Pi, so if c1, c2 2 C [ {;},
c1 6= c2, and c1 Ri c2, then c1 Pi c2. School c is acceptable to student i if the student prefers
it to the outside option, that is, c Pi ;. Each school c 2 C has a capacity qc 2 N, which is
the maximum number of students that the school can admit, and a priority ordering ⌫c
over the set of students N .10 The strict part of the priority ordering ⌫c is denoted by  c.
An assignment is a mapping µ : N [ C ! N [ C [ {;} such that
(i) for each i 2 N , µ(i) 2 C [ {;},
(ii) for each c 2 C, µ(c) ✓ N such that |µ(c)|  qc, and
(iii) for each i 2 N and each c 2 C, i 2 µ(c) if and only if c = µ(i).
Let A denote the set of all assignments.
An assignment µ is individually rational if for each i 2 N , µ(i) Ri ;.
An assignment µ Pareto improves an assignment µ0 if for each i 2 N , µ(i) Ri µ0(i) and
there exists j 2 N such that µ(j) Pj µ0(j). An assignment µ is e cient if it cannot be
Pareto improved.
A pair (i, c) 2 N ⇥ C blocks µ if c Pi µ(i) and [|µ(c)| < qc or there exists j 2 µ(c) such
that i  c j]. Let
B(µ) = {(i, c) 2 N ⇥ C : (i, c) blocks µ}
denote the set of blocking pairs at µ and let Bi(µ) = B(µ) \ ({i} ⇥ C) denote the set of
blocking pairs at µ containing student i.
An assignment µ is stable if it is individually rational and includes no blocking pair.
Unfortunately, there exist school choice problems without an assignment that is both e cient
and stable (Roth, 1982). We investigate assignments which are minimally unstable among
e cient assignments based on methods to compare assignments by their stability.
9Formally, a preference ordering over C [ {;} is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation
over C [ {;}. Binary relation Ri over C [ {;} is complete if, for every c1, c2 2 C [ {;}, c1Ric2 or c2Ric1. It
is transitive if, for every c1, c2, c3 2 C [ {;}, c1Ric2 and c2Ric3 imply c1Ric3. It is anti-symmetric if, for
every c1, c2 2 C [ {;}, c1Ric2 and c2Ric1 imply c1 = c2.
10The priority ordering ⌫c is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation over N . Our
results extend to the more general setup where some students may be unacceptable for some schools.
6
A (school choice) problem P is a quintuple (N,C,R, q,⌫) where R = (Ri)i2N denotes the
(student) preference profile, q = (qc)c2C denotes the (school) capacity profile, and ⌫= (⌫c)c2C
denotes the (school) priority profile. We keep everything except the preference profile fixed,
and for short a problem is denoted by R. Let P denote the set of all problems.
3.1 Stability Comparisons
A stability comparison is a function f associating with each problem P 2 P a binary
relation f(P ) over assignments.11 Instead of f(P ), we write &Pf (where µ ◆Pf ⌫ means that
µ is f -more stable than ⌫ at P ). We say that µ is f-minimally unstable at P among
e cient assignments if µ is e cient and there exists no e cient assignment ⌫ such that
⌫ ◆Pf µ. We will use the abbreviation a.e.a. for “among e cient assignments”.
Below, we describe two natural methods for stability comparisons based on blocking pairs
and blocking students. Each of them has an inclusion method and a (corresponding) cardinal
method.
3.1.1 Blocking Pairs
The blocking pairs inclusion comparison (pincl) is defined as follows. For each problem P 2 P
and µ, ⌫ 2 A,
µ &Ppincl ⌫ , B(µ) ✓ B(⌫).
Among others, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020) and Tang and Zhang (2020) study this stability
comparison.
The blocking pairs cardinality comparison (pcard) is defined as follows. For each problem
P 2 P and µ, ⌫ 2 A,
µ &Ppcard ⌫ , |B(µ)|  |B(⌫)|.
Obviously, for any problem P : (i) &Ppincl✓&Ppcard, (ii) &Ppincl is transitive but not complete,
and (iii) &Ppcard is complete (as any two assignments can be compared) and transitive.
We will use the convention to write more stable instead of pincl-more stable, minimally
unstable instead of pincl-minimally unstable, cardinally more stable instead of pcard-more
11A binary relation over assignments is a subset &✓ A ⇥A. We write µ & ⌫ instead of (µ, ⌫) 2&, and
[µ ◆ ⌫ , µ & ⌫& not ⌫ & µ]. Let L denote the set of all binary relations. Given &2 L, (i) & is complete if
for all µ, ⌫ 2 A we have µ & ⌫ or ⌫ & µ and (ii) & is transitive if µ & ⌫ and ⌫ & ⌘ imply µ & ⌘. Furthermore,
given &,&02 L such that &✓&0 we say that & is coarser than &0 and &0 is finer than &.
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stable, and cardinally minimally unstable instead of pcard-minimally unstable.
3.1.2 Blocking Students
The blocking students inclusion comparison (sincl) is defined as follows. Let BS(µ) = {i 2
N : Bi(µ) 6= ;}. For each problem P 2 P and µ, ⌫ 2 A,
µ &Psincl ⌫ , BS(µ) ✓ BS(⌫).
The blocking students cardinality comparison (scard) is defined as follows. For each
P 2 P and µ, ⌫ 2 A(P ),
µ &Pscard ⌫ , |BS(µ)|  |BS(⌫)|.
Obviously, (i) &Psincl✓&Pscard, (ii) &Psincl is transitive but not complete and (iii) &Pscard is
complete and transitive.
We will use the convention to write BS-wise more stable instead of sincl-more stable,
BS-wise minimally unstable instead of sincl-minimally unstable, BS-wise cardinally more
stable instead of scard-more stable, and BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable instead of
scard-minimally unstable.
Remark 1 For any stable assignment µ, there is no other assignment which is (cardinally)
more stable or BS-wise (cardinally) more stable than µ. However, µ is not necessarily
minimally unstable among e cient assignments since µ may not be e cient.
3.2 Mechanisms: DA and EADA
A mechanism associates each problem with an assignment. When we say that a mechanism
satisfies a certain assignment property (such as e ciency or minimal instability among
e cient assignments), we mean that at each problem, the assignment prescribed by the
mechanism satisfies the property.
The deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism due to Gale and Shapley (1962) is used in
many school districts that have reformed their school choice systems. The DA mechanism
associates each problem P with the assignment determined by the following deferred
acceptance algorithm.
Deferred Acceptance (DA) Algorithm:
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Step 1. Each student proposes to her top-ranked acceptable school. If there is
no such school, then she is assigned to her outside option. Each school c considers
the set of proposals that it receives. Among them, it tentatively accepts the
highest priority students up to its capacity and rejects the others. If there is no
rejection, then stop.
Step t   2. Each student who is rejected at Step t 1 proposes to her top-ranked
acceptable school among the ones that have not rejected her yet. If there is no
such school, then she is assigned to her outside option. Each school c considers
the set of students that it tentatively accepted at Step t 1 together with students
that have proposed at Step t. Among them, it tentatively accepts the highest
priority students up to its capacity and rejects the others. If there is no rejection,
then stop. Otherwise, move to Step t+ 1.
The DA algorithm stops in finitely many steps and the DA assignment, which we denote
by DA(P ), is defined by the acceptances at the last step. At each problem, the DA assignment
is stable but not necessarily e cient (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
The e ciency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) mechanism (Kesten, 2010)
is based on the EADA algorithm which works by iteratively removing certain schools from
the preference orderings of certain students and rerunning the DA algorithm. Instead of
providing Kesten’s original definition of the EADA algorithm, we provide a simplified version
due to Tang and Yu (2014). Given an assignment µ, a school c 2 C is underdemanded at
µ if no student strictly prefers it to his assigned school. We adopt the convention that for
each student i 2 N , his outside option is underdemanded at any assignment.
E ciency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) Algorithm:
Round 0. Run DA for the problem P = (N,C,R, q,⌫).
Round r   1. Identify underdemanded schools at the outcome of Round r   1.
Let Ir denote the set of students who are assigned to underdemanded schools
(including the students who are assigned to their outside options). Let µr denote
the restriction of the outcome of Round r   1 to Ir (note that µr includes only
the underdemanded schools and students in Ir.) Remove these schools and Ir
from the problem. Stop if there are no remaining schools. Otherwise, run DA for
the reduced problem. Move to the next round, Round r + 1.
The EADA algorithm stops in finitely many rounds, say in m rounds. The EADA
assignment is defined as the collection of µ1, . . ., µm. That is, EADA(P ) = µ1[ · · ·[µm. For
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each t 2 {1, . . . ,m}, let µt denote the assignment obtained by collecting µ1, . . . , µt together
with the DA assignment for the reduced problem at the end of Round t. In other words, µt
is the assignment obtained by iterating the EADA algorithm for only t rounds. Note that
µm = EADA(P ), and µm contains at least as many blocking pairs as steps where at least
one student is assigned a di↵erent school than at the previous step: if there is an additional
step and a student is assigned a di↵erent school, then there is a Pareto improvement which
was blocked by some student-school pair at the previous step.
At each problem, the EADA assignment is e cient and Pareto improves the DA assignment
(Tang and Yu, 2014; Kesten, 2010).
Remark 2 Given a problem, if the EADA assignment coincides with the DA assignment,
then the EADA assignment is the unique assignment that is (BS-wise) (cardinally) minimally
unstable among e cient assignments.
4 Minimal Instability of E cient Improvements of DA
We explore the minimal instability of Pareto improvements of DA according to our stability
comparisons based on blocking pairs and blocking students. We do this for inclusion
comparisons and the corresponding cardinal comparisons.
The following result shows that there exists a mechanism which is a Pareto improvement
over the DA mechanism and minimally unstable among e cient assignments for the blocking
pairs inclusion comparison. In particular, the EADA mechanism is minimally unstable among
e cient assignments for the blocking pairs inclusion comparison.12 Unfortunately, this is not
true for the blocking students inclusion comparison.
Proposition 1 (Inclusion Comparisons and EADA) (i) The EADA mechanism is
minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(ii) The EADA mechanism is NOT BS-wise minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
In particular, there is no e cient mechanism which is both a Pareto improvement over
the DA mechanism and BS-wise minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. We show (i) in Appendix A.1.
12Part (i) also follows from Tang and Zhang (2020). We thank Szilvia Papai for bringing this to our
awareness. We present our proof, which is independent and di↵erent than the one in Tang and Zhang (2020),
in Appendix A.1.
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In showing (ii), consider the following problem P : let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, C =
{c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6} (all with unit capacities), and
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 ⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c3 ⌫c4 ⌫c5 ⌫c6
c1 c1 c3 c3 c4 c1 c6 7 2 5 4 1 3
c5 c2 c2 c4 c3 ; c5 6 3 3 5 7 7












1 2 3 4 5 6 7




1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c5 c1 c2 c3 c4 ; c6
!
and BS(EADA(P )) = {1, 3, 6} (since B(EADA(P )) = {(1, c1), (3, c3), (6, c1)}).
Consider the following assignment µ:
µ =
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c1 c2 c6 c3 c4 ; c5
!
where BS(µ) = {3, 6} (since B(µ) = {(3, c1), (6, c1)}). Note that µ is e cient and Pareto
improves over DA. Moreover, µ is BS-wise more stable than EADA(P ) since BS(µ) (
BS(EADA(P )). Furthermore, note that µ and EADA(P ) are the only e cient Pareto
imrpovements over DA(P ).13
Consider the following assignment ⌫:
⌫ =
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c5 c2 ; c3 c4 c1 c6
!
where BS(⌫) = {3} (since B(⌫) = {(3, c3), (3, c6)}). Note that ⌫ is e cient and BS-wise
more stable than µ and EADA(P ).
Now in Proposition 1 (i) is encouraging, but (ii) already shows that no e cient mechanism,
13This follows because for any e cient Pareto improvment ⌘ over DA(P ), we must have ⌘(6) = ;, ⌘(4) = c3,
⌘(5) = c4 and ⌘(7) 6= c1. If ⌘(7) = c5, then ⌘ = µ and if ⌘(7) = c6, then ⌘ = µ.
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which is a Pareto improvement over DA, is BS-wise minimally unstable a.e.a.. Below we
show that the last result extends to the two cardinal comparison methods.
Proposition 2 (Cardinal Comparisons and E cient Assignments) (i) The EADA
mechanism is NOT (BS-wise) cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assign-
ments.
(ii) There is no e cient mechanism which is a Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism
and (BS-wise) cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(iii) For any n   3, there exists a unit-capacity problem P with |N | = n and |C| = n   1
and an e cient assignment µ such that EADA(P ) is the unique e cient Pareto
improvement over DA(P ) and
|B(EADA(P ))| = n  1 and |B(µ)| = 1.
Proof. Note that (i) follows from (ii) as EADA is an e cient mechanism which is a Pareto
improvement over DA. Furthermore, for BS-wise cardinal minimal instability, (ii) follows
from (ii) of Proposition 1 as BS-wise cardinal minimal instability implies BS-wise minimal
instability. For cardinal minimal instability, (ii) follows from (iii) as n   3.
In showing (iii), consider the following problem P : let N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, C =
{c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn 1} (all with unit capacities) and
R1 R2 R3 · · · Rn 1 Rn ⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c3 · · · ⌫cn 2 ⌫cn 1
c1 c1 c2 cn 2 cn 1 n 2 3 · · · n  2 n  1
c2 c2 c3 cn 1 c1 1 1 1 · · · 1 1















1 2 3 · · · n  1 n




1 2 3 · · · n  1 n
; c1 c2 · · · cn 2 cn 1
!
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and B(EADA(P )) = {(1, c1), (1, c2), . . . , (1, cn 2), (1, cn 1)}. Note that the EADA assign-
ment is the unique e cient Pareto improvement over the DA assignment.
Consider the following assignment µ.
µ =
 
1 2 3 · · · n  1 n
c1 c2 c3 · · · cn 1 ;
!
where B(µ) = {(n, c1)}. Note that µ is e cient and is cardinally more stable than
EADA(P ).
Note that in Proposition 2 we considered minimal instability among the whole set of
e cient assignments. In particular, in the proof of (iii) of Proposition 2, the e cient
assignment, which is cardinally more stable than the EADA assignment, is not a Pareto
improvement over the DA assignment. However, we show next that (i) and (ii) of Proposition
2 remain unchanged when we restrict ourselves to e cient Pareto improvements over DA.
Proposition 3 (E cient Pareto Improvements over DA) (i) The EADA mechanism
is NOT BS-wise (cardinally) minimally unstable among e cient Pareto improvements
over the DA mechanism.
(ii) The EADA mechanism is NOT cardinally minimally unstable among e cient Pareto
improvements over the DA mechanism.
(iii) For any n   5, there exists a unit-capacity problem P with |N | = n and |C| = n   1
and an e cient assignment µ such that µ Pareto improves over DA(P ) and
|B(EADA(P ))| = n  2 and |B(µ)| = 2.
Proof. In showing (i), note that in the example for the proof of (iii) of Proposition 1 we
have BS(µ) = {3, 6} ( {1, 3, 6} = BS(EADA(P )).
Note that (ii) follows from (iii) as n   5.
In showing (iii), consider the following problem P : let N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, C =
13
{c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn 1} (all with unit capacities) and
R1 R2 R3 · · · Rn 2 Rn 1 Rn ⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c3 · · · ⌫cn 3 ⌫cn 2 ⌫cn 1
c1 c1 c2 · · · cn 3 c1 cn 1 n 2 3 · · · n  3 1 n  2
c2 c2 c3 · · · c1 ; cn 2 n  1 1 1 · · · 1 n n
c3 ; ; · · · cn 1 c1 n  2 3 4 · · · n  2
... 1








1 2 3 · · · n  2 n  1 n




1 2 3 · · · n  2 n  1 n
cn 2 c1 c2 · · · cn 3 ; cn 1
!
and B(EADA(P )) = {(1, c1), (1, c2), . . . , (1, cn 3), (n  1, c1)} and |B(EADA(P ))| = n  2.
Consider the following assignment µ.
µ =
 
1 2 3 · · · n  2 n  1 n
c1 c2 c3 · · · cn 1 ; cn 2
!
where B(µ) = {(n   2, c1), (n   1, c1)} and |B(µ)| = 2. Note that µ is e cient, µ Pareto
improves over DA, and µ is cardinally more stable than EADA(P ).
5 Domain Restrictions
Recall that the DA mechanism is stable but not necessarily e cient. In an important
contribution, Ergin (2002) derived necessary and su cient conditions (on the capacity-
priority profile) for the e ciency of the DA mechanism.
The EADA mechanism is e cient but not necessarily cardinally minimally unstable. Here
we ask a parallel question to Ergin (2002) for cardinal minimal instability: when is the
EADA-mechanism cardinally minimally unstable? More generally, for which priority profiles,
does there exist a Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism which is cardinally minimally
unstable among e cient assignments at each problem? We investigate this question under
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the following two assumptions:
A1. (Unit capacities) Each school has unit capacity, i.e., qc = 1 for each c 2 C.
A2. (At least five schools) There are at least five schools, i.e., |C|   5.
The following notions will be useful. A priority profile (⌫c)c2C includes an Ergin-cycle
(Ergin, 2002) if there exist a list of three students (i1, i2, i3) and a pair of schools (c1, c2) such
that i3  c1 i1  c1 i2 and i2  c2 i3. We call student i1 as the initiator of the cycle.
We say that a list of three students (i1, i2, i3) and a pair of schools (c1, c2) constitute a
tight Ergin-cycle if they constitute an Ergin-cycle, and both
I. there is no m 2 N \ {i2, i3} such that i2  c2 m  c2 i3 and
II. there is no m 2 N \ {i1, i2, i3} such that i3  c1 m  c1 i2.
Given two Ergin-cycles consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c
0
2), respectively, we
say that the Ergin-cycles are distinct if all the students and schools in the two Ergin-cycles
are distinct, i.e., {i1, i2, i3} \ {j1, j2, j3} = ; and {c1, c2} \ {c01, c02} = ;. We say that the two
Ergin-cycles are distinct except for the initiator if i1 = j1 and all the other students and
schools in the two Ergin-cycles are distinct.
We introduce the following three conditions on a priority profile (⌫c)c2C .
Condition C1: All Ergin-cycles are tight.
Condition C2: There are no two Ergin-cycles that are distinct except for the initiator.
Condition C3: There are no two distinct Ergin-cycles.
Our main result of this section, Theorem 1, is that these three conditions are necessary
for the EADA assignment to be cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments ;
even more, each of them is necessary for the existence of a Pareto improvement over DA
which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.14 Moreoever, the three
conditions are su cient for the EADA assignment to be cardinally minimally unstable among
e cient assignments.
Theorem 1 Suppose each school has unit capacity and there are at least five schools. Then
the following are equivalent:
14In Appendix A.2, we show that the counterparts of the characterizing conditions in the multi-capacity
case are still necessary conditions for the EADA assignment to be cardinally minimally unstable a.e.a..
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(i) The EADA mechanism is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(ii) There exists an e cient mechanism which is both a Pareto improvement over DA and
cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(iii) The priority profile satisfies C1, C2 and C3.
We next investigate the same questions as in Theorem 1 for BS-wise cardinal minimal
instability (instead of cardinal minimal instability. It turns the corresponding result is almost
identical except for one new cycle condition.
We say that a list of three students (i1, i2, i3) and a pair of schools (c1, c2) constitute
a weakly tight Ergin-cycle if they constitute an Ergin-cycle, and there is no m 2 N \
{i1, i2, i3} such that i3  c1 m  c1 i2 or i2  c2 m  c2 i3.15
Condition C4: All Ergin-cycles are weakly tight.
Theorem 2 Suppose each school has unit capacity and there are at least five schools. Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) The EADA mechanism is BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable among e cient as-
signments.
(ii) There exists an e cient mechanism which is both a Pareto improvement over DA and
BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(iii) The priority profile satisfies C2, C3 and C4.
Remark 3 (a) The proof of Theorem 1 (and, respectively, of Theorem 2) shows that if the
priority profile satisfies C1, C2 and C3, then for each problem either the DA assignment
is e cient or there exists a unique Pareto improvement of the DA assignment which
contains exactly one blocking pair (and, respectively, one blocking student). Therefore,
the latter assignment coincides with EADA assignment.
(b) By (a), under C1, C2 and C3 the EADA assignment contains no blocking student if the
DA assignment is e cient and otherwise exactly one blocking student. Thus, the EADA
mechanism is BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments if the
15Note that every tight Ergin-cycle is also weakly tight.
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satisfies C2, C3 and C4 but violates C1. Hence, the EADA mechanism is BS-wise
cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments but not cardinally minimally
unstable among e cient assignment. This is in contrast to the inclusion stability com-
parisons where the EADA mechanism is minimally unstable among e cient assignments
but not necessarily BS-wise minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
(c) As the set of e cient Pareto improvements over DA is a subset of the e cient as-
signments, the conditions C1, C2 and C3 are su cient for the EADA mechanism to
be cardinally minimally stable among e cient Pareto improvements over DA: when
counting blocking pairs this follows from Theorem 1 and when counting blocking students
this follows from (b). It is an open question to determine necessary and su cient
conditions for the EADA mechanism to be cardinally minimally unstable among e cient
Pareto improvements over DA (where blocking pairs or blocking students are counted).
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
(i))(ii): This follows from the fact that EADA is an e cient mechanism which is a Pareto
improvement over DA.
(ii))(iii): We show that if one of the conditions C1, C2 or C3 is violated, then there exist
problems where no e cient Pareto improvement over DA is cardinally minimally unstable.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the priority profile violates Condition C1, i.e., it includes an
Ergin-cycle that is not tight. Then, there exists a problem such that there is no Pareto
improvement over DA which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. Suppose that a list of students (1, 2, 3) and a list of schools (c1, c2) constitute an
Ergin-cycle of (⌫c)c2C that is not tight.
Case 1: Suppose that there is m 2 N \ {2, 3} such that 2  c2 m  c2 3 and also suppose that
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Let R be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of students in {1, 2, 3}






Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3} are as depicted
above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3} are as underlined
above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over the DA assignment that is e cient
and µ0 is an e cient assignment. Moreover, B(µ) = {(1, c1), (1, c2)} and B(µ0) = {(3, c1)}.
Case 2: Suppose that there is m 2 N \ {2, 3} such that 3  c2 m  c2 2 and also suppose that





Let R be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of {1, 2, 3,m} over their
acceptable schools are as depicted below, and each other student finds no school acceptable.
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R1 R2 Rm R3
c1 c1 c2 c2
; c2 ; c1
; ;
Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3,m} are as
depicted above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3,m} are as
underlined above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over the DA assignment that is e cient
and µ0 is an e cient assignment. Moreover, B(µ) = {(1, c1), (m, c2)} and B(µ0) = {(3, c1)}.
Case 3: Suppose that there is m 2 N \ {1, 2, 3} such that 3  c1 m  c1 2. Without loss of
generality, suppose that m  c1 1. Below, we only depict the relative positions of the students






Let R be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of {1, 2, 3,m} over their
acceptable schools are as depicted below, and each other student finds no school acceptable.
R1 R2 R3 Rm
c1 c1 c2 c1
; c2 c1 ;
; ;
Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3,m} are as
depicted above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {1, 2, 3,m}are as
underlined above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over the DA assignment that is e cient
and µ0 is an e cient assignment. Moreover, B(µ) = {(1, c1), (m, c1)} and B(µ0) = {(3, c1)}.
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Proposition 5 Suppose that the priority profile violates Condition C2, i.e., it includes two
Ergin-cycles that are distinct except for the initiator. Then, there exists a problem such
that there is no Pareto improvement over DA which is cardinally minimally unstable among
e cient assignments.
Proof. Suppose that there are two Ergin-cycles of (⌫c)c2C consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2),
and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c
0
2), that are distinct except for the initiator. Let i1 = j1 ⌘ i.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 j3 j2
i i3 i j3
i2 j2
Let R be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of students in {i, i2, , i3, j2, j3}
over their acceptable schools are as depicted below, and each other student finds no school
acceptable.
Ri Ri2 Ri3 Rj2 Rj3
c1 c1 c2 c01 c
0
2





; ; ; ; ;
Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {i, i2, , i3, j2, j3} are as
depicted above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {i, i2, , i3, j2, j3} are as
underlined above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over DA that is e cient and µ0 is an
e cient assignment. Moreover, B(µ) = {(i, c1), (i, c01)} and B(µ0) = {(i3, c1)}.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the priority profile violates Condition C3, i.e., it includes two
distinct Ergin-cycles. Then, there exists a problem such that there is no Pareto improvement
over DA which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. Suppose that there are two distinct generalized cycles of (⌫c)c2C consisting of
(i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c
0
2). Below, we only depict the relevant relative positions
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of the students (i1, i2, i3, j1, j2, j3) in ⌫.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 j3 j2
i1 i3 j1 j3
i2 j2
Since |C|   5, there exists c 2 C \ {c1, c2, c01, c02}. Without loss of generality, suppose that
j1  c i1.
LetR be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of students in (i1, i2, i3, j1, j2, j3)
over their acceptable schools are as depicted below, and each other student finds no school
acceptable.
Ri1 Ri2 Ri3 Rj1 Rj2 Rj3





c1 c2 c1 c c02 c
0
1
; ; ; ; ; ;
Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in (i1, i2, i3, j1, j2, j3) are
as depicted above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in (i1, i2, i3, j1, j2, j3) are
as underlined above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over DA that is e cient and µ0 is an
e cient assignment. Moreover, B(µ) = {(i1, c1), (j1, c01)} and B(µ0) = {(j2, c02)}.
(iii))(i): We will now show that C1, C2 and C3 are su cient for the EADA assignment to
be cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments. First, we define some auxiliary
notions and prove some auxiliary results.
A priority profile (⌫c)c2C includes a generalized cycle (of length n  1) if there exist a
list of students (1, . . . , n) and a list of schools (c1, . . . , cn 1) such that n  c1 1  c1 2 and for
each i 2 {2, . . . , n  1}, i  ci i+ 1.16 Given a generalized cycle consisting of (1, . . . , n) and
(c1, . . . , cn 1), we call the first student, student 1, as the initiator of the generalized cycle.17
Given two generalized cycles consisting of (i1, . . . , in), (c1, . . . , cn 1), and (j1, . . . , jm),
(c01, . . . , c
0
m 1), respectively, we say that the two generalized cycles are distinct if all the
16The notion of a generalized cycle was first introduced in Ergin (2002).
17Note that in the definition of a generalized cycle, the first school c1 and the first student 1 have particular
roles; in that sense, rotating the elements of a generalized cycle would not necessarily result in a new
generalized cycle, in contrast to what the word “cycle” would normally indicate.
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students and schools in the two generalized cycles are distinct, i.e., {i1, . . . , in}\{j1, . . . , jm} =
; and {c1, . . . , cn 1}\{c01, . . . , c0m 1} = ;. We say that the two generalized cycles are distinct
except for the initiator if i1 = j1 and all the other students and schools in the two
generalized cycles are distinct.
We say that a list of students (1, . . . , n) and a list of schools (c1, . . . , cn 1) constitute a
tight generalized cycle (of length n  1) if they constitute a generalized cycle and
I. there is no m 2 N \ {2, . . . , n} and k 2 {2, . . . , n  1} such that k  ck m  ck k + 1
II. and there is no m 2 N \ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that n  c1 m  c1 2.
Lemma 1 If the priority profile satisfies C3, then there are no two distinct generalized cycles.
Proof. Note that Ergin-cycles are generalized cycles of length 2. Thus, if there are two
distinct Ergin-cyles, then there are two distinct generalized cycles. Furthermore, if there are
two distinct generalized cycles, then by Ergin (2002) (Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1),
there are two distinct Ergin-cycles.
Lemma 2 If the priority profile satisfies C2 and C3, then there are no two generalized cycles
that are distinct except for the initiator.
Proof. Consider any two generalized cycles consisting of (i1, . . . , in), (c1, . . . , cn 1), and
(j1, . . . , jm), (c01, . . . , c
0
m 1), that are distinct except for the initiator. Then i1 = j1 and all the
other students and schools in the two generalized cycles are distinct. But then, by Ergin
(2002) (Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1), either there exist two distinct Ergin-cycles, which
implies that C3 is violated, or there exist two Ergin-cycles that are distinct except for the
initiator, which implies that C2 is violated.
Lemma 3 If the priority profile satisfies C1, C2, and C3, then all generalized cycles are
tight.
Proof. Suppose that there is a generalized cycle which is not tight. Then there are a list of
students (1, . . . , n) and a list of schools (c1, . . . , cn 1) such that
(1) there is m 2 N \ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that n  c1 m  c1 2 or
(2) there is m 2 N \ {2, . . . , n} and k 2 {2, . . . , n  1} such that k  ck m  ck k + 1.
22
If n  1 = 2, then there is an Ergin-cycle which is not tight, which implies that C1 is violated.
So, suppose that n  1 > 2.
Step 1: Suppose that (1) is satisfied. Without loss of generality, suppose that there is no
shorter generalized cycle which satisfies (1). If 2  c2 n, then there exists an Ergin-cycle that
is not tight, consisting of (1, 2, n) and (c1, c2), which violates C1. Similarly, if there exists
l 2 {1, . . . , n   1} such that 2  cl n, then there exists an Ergin-cycle that is not tight. So
suppose that n  cl 2 for all l 2 {1, . . . , n  1}.
Now, if n  2  cn 1 n  1  cn 1 n  cn 1 2, then there is a shorter generalized cycle which
satisfes (1), consisting of (n, 2, 3, . . . , n   3, n   2) and (cn 1, c2, . . . , cn 2), a contradiction.
If n   1  cn 1 n   2  cn 1 n  cn 1 2, then, again, there is a shorter generalized cycle
which satisfes (1), consisting of (1, 2, . . . , n   2, n) and (c1, . . . , cn 3, cn 1), a contradiction.
If n  1  cn 1 n  cn 1 n  2  cn 1 2, then, again, there is a shorter generalized cycle which
satisfes (1), consisting of (n   2, 2, 3, . . . , n   2, n   1) and (cn 1, c2, c3, . . . , cn 2, cn 1), a
contradiction. If n   1  cn 1 n  cn 1 2  cn 1 n   2, then, there exists an Ergin-cycle that
is not tight, consisting of (2, n   2, n   1) and (cn 1, cn 2), which is a violation of C1, a
contradiction. Hence (1) cannot be satisfied.
Step 2: Suppose that (1) is not satisfied but (2) is satisfied. Without loss of generality,
suppose that there is no shorter generalized cycle which satisfies (2). Note that m 6= 1 or
m = 1.
Suppose that m 6= 1. If k  ck 1  ck k + 1, clearly there is a generalized cycle which
satisfes (1), a contradiction. Thus, 1  ck k or k + 1  ck 1. If 1  ck k, then the generalized
cycle consisting of (k, k + 1, . . . , n, 1) and (ck, . . . , cn 1, c1) satisfies (1) by 1  ck m  ck k + 1,
a contradiction. If k+ 1  ck 1, then the generalized cycle consisting of (k+ 1, 1, 2, . . . , k) and
(ck, c1, . . . , ck 1) satisfies (1) by k  ck m  ck 1, a contradiction.
Suppose that m = 1. If k + 1  ck n, then the generalized cycle consisting of (k +
1, n, 2, 3, . . . , k) and (ck, c1, c2, . . . , ck 1) satisfies (1) by k  ck 1  ck k + 1, a contradic-
tion. Similarly, if n  ck k, then the generalized cycle consisting of (k, k + 1, . . . , n) and
(ck, ck+1, . . . , cn) satisfies (1) by k  ck 1  ck k + 1, a contradiction. Thus, k  ck n  ck k + 1.
If k+1  c1 2, then the generalized cycle consisting of (n, k+1, 2, . . . , k) and (ck, c1, . . . , ck 1)
satisfies (1) by k  ck 1  ck k + 1, a contradiction. Thus, 2  c1 k + 1. But then the
generalized cycle consisting of (2, k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n) and (c1, ck+1, . . . , cn 1) satisfies (1) by
n  c1 1  c1 k + 1, a contradiction.
Given an assignment µ, a list of students (i1, . . . , ik) is called an improvement cycle18
18The notion of an improvement cycle is from Dur et al. (2019).
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if µ(it+1) Pit µ(it) for each t 2 {1, . . . , k   1} and µ(i1) Pik µ(ik).19 In this case, we say that
student it precedes student it+1 in the improvement cycle. We say that an assignment µ0
is obtained by implementing an improvement cycle at µ if µ0 is obtained from µ by
simply assigning each student in the improvement cycle to the school of the student whom
he precedes, keeping the assignments of the students who do not belong to the improvement
cycle the same.
Proposition 7 Suppose that every generalized cycle of the priority profile is tight. Then,
at each problem where the DA assignment is not e cient, there is a unique e cient Pareto
improvement over the DA assignment.
Proof. Let P = (N,C,R, q,⌫) be a problem such that every generalized cycle of (⌫c)c2C is
tight. Let µ denote the DA assignment.
Step 1: We will first show that there is no student who is included in two di↵erent
“improvement cycles” at µ.
We claim that any two di↵erent improvement cycles cannot have a common student.
Suppose not, i.e. suppose that (i1, . . . , ik) and (j1, . . . , jq) are improvement cycles such
that (i1, . . . , ik) 6= (j1, . . . , jq) and {i1, . . . , ik} \ {j1, . . . , jq} 6= ;. We claim that there exists
i 2 {i1, . . . , ik} \ {j1, . . . , jq} such that the student preceding i in the cycle (i1, . . . , ik), say
student j, and the student preceding i in the cycle (j1, . . . , jk), say student j0, are di↵erent
students, i.e. j 6= j0. To see this, consider any student i 2 {i1, . . . , ik} \ {j1, . . . , jq}. If the
students preceding i in the two cycles are di↵erent, then we are done. Otherwise, the student
j who precedes i in both cycles satisfies j 2 {i1, . . . , ik} \ {j1, . . . , jq}. Proceeding similarly,
our claim follows from the facts that the two cycles are finite and di↵erent.
Now, without loss of generality, suppose that the two cycles are of the form (j, i1, . . . , ik)
and (j0, i1, j1, . . . , jq) such that j 6= j0. Let c1 ⌘ µ(i1). Note that c1 Pj µ(j) and c1 Pj0 µ(j0).
Then, by the stability of µ, we have i1  c1 {j, j0}. Without loss of generality, suppose that
i1  c1 j0  c1 j. Let ct ⌘ µ(it) for each t 2 {1, . . . , k}, and let c0 ⌘ µ(j). Since (j, i1, . . . , ik) is
an improvement cycle, by Ergin (2002),20 there exist t 2 {0, 1, . . . , k} and i 2 N\{i1, . . . , ik, j}
such that (ct, ct 1, . . . , c0, ck, ck 1, . . . , ct+1) and (i, it 1, it 2, . . . , i1, j, ik, ik 1, . . . , it+1, it) con-
19Note that for any t 2 {1, . . . , k}, (it, it+1, . . . , ik, i1, . . . , it 1) is also an improvement cycle including the
same set of students.
20More precisely, it follows from arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002).
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stitute a cycle of (⌫c)c2C .
⌫c0 ⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c3 · · · ⌫ct · · · ⌫ck
j i1 i2 i3 it ik
ik j0 i1 i2 · · · i · · · ik 1
j it 1
However, note that whether t = 1 or t 6= 1, (⌫c)c2C includes a generalized cycle that is not
tight, which is a contradiction. Hence, no two improvement cycles share a common student.
Step 2: By Lemma 6 of Dur et al. (2019), for any Pareto improvement µ0 over the DA
assignment µ, there exist a set of disjoint improvement cycles (that is, no two improvement
cycles share a common student) such that µ0 can be obtained from µ by implementing the
improvement cycles. Since any two improvement cycles are disjoint, there is a unique e cient
Pareto improvement over the DA assignment.
Proposition 8 Suppose that every generalized cycle of the priority profile is tight. Then,
at each problem, any assignment obtained from the DA assignment by implementing an
improvement cycle includes a unique blocking pair.
Proof. Let P = (N,C,R, q,⌫) be a problem such that every generalized cycle of (⌫c)c2C
is tight. Let µ denote the DA assignment. Let µ0 be obtained from µ by implementing
the improvement cycle (i1, . . . , ik). Let ct ⌘ µ(it 1) for each t 2 {2, . . . , k} and c1 ⌘ µ(ik).
Suppose that µ0 includes two blocking pairs (i, c) 6= (j, c0).
Since (i1, . . . , ik) is an improvement cycle, by Ergin (2002) there exist t 2 {1, . . . , k}
(without loss of generality, let t = 1) and i0 2 N \ {i1, . . . , ik} such that (c1, . . . , ck) and
(i0, i1, . . . , ik) constitute a cycle of (⌫c)c2C .
⌫c1 ⌫c2 · · · ⌫ck
ik i1 · · · ik 1
i0 i2 · · · ik
i1
Note that since (i, c), (j, c0) 2 B(µ0) \B(µ), c, c0 2 {c1, . . . , ck}.
Case 1: Suppose that c = c1. Since (i, c) 2 B(µ0) \ B(µ), ik  c1 i  c1 i1. If i 6= i0, this
contradicts that every generalized cycle is tight. Suppose that i = i0. Now, either j 6= i0 or
c0 6= c1. In either case, by similar arguments, it is easy to see that there is a generalized cycle
is that is not tight.
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Case 2: Suppose that c = ct, t 6= 1. Since (i, c) 2 B(µ0) \ B(µ), it 1  ct i  ct it, which
indicates that there is a generalized cycle that is not tight.
Let P = (N,C,R, q,⌫) be a problem. By Lemma 3, every generalized cycle of (⌫c)c2C
is tight. Then, by Proposition 7 all the improvement cycles at DA(P ) are distinct and the
assignment obtained from DA(P ) by implementing the improvement cycles, let us call it
µ, is the unique e cient Pareto improvement over DA(P ). Now, there can be at most one
improvement cycle, since otherwise there must exist two generalized cycles that are either
distinct, which would be a violation of Condition C3 by Lemma 1, or distinct except for
the initiator, which would be a violation of Condition C2 or C3 by Lemma 2. Now, by
Proposition 8, µ includes at most one blocking pair.
If µ includes no blocking pair, then it is trivially cardinally minimally unstable among
e cient assignments (in fact, this means that the DA assignment is e cient at this problem).
Suppose that µ includes a unique blocking pair. Suppose that µ is not cardinally minimally
unstable among e cient assignments. Then, there exist an e cient assignment µ0 without a
blocking pair. But then, DA(P ) does not include any improvement cycle and therefore µ
cannot have a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Thus, µ = EADA(P ), and the EADA mechanism is cardinally minimally unstable among
e cient assignments.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
(i))(ii): This follows from the fact that EADA is an e cient mechanism which is a Pareto
improvement over DA.
(ii))(iii): We show that if one of the conditions C2, C3 or C4 is violated, then there exist
problems where no e cient Pareto improvement over DA is BS-wise cardinally minimally
unstable.
Note that in the proof of Proposition 4, Case 2 and Case 3 remain valid for BS-wise
cardinal minimal stability, i.e. C4 has to be satisfied. Similarly, the proof of Proposition 6
remains valid for BS-wise cardinal minimal stability, i.e. C3 has to be satisfied. In showing
C2, we make the following détour with another condition.
Condition C5: If two Ergin-cycles share exactly one common student and no common
schools, and if the common student is the initiator of one of the two cycles, then he must
be the initiator of the other cycle as well. Formally, for any two Ergin-cycles consisting of
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(i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c
0
2), respectively, if {i1, i2, i3} \ {j1, j2, j3} = {i1} and
{c1, c2} \ {c01, c02} = ;, then i1 = j1.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the priority profile violates C5. Then, there exists a problem
such that there is no Pareto improvement over DA which is BS-wise cardinally minimally
unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. Suppose that there are two Ergin-cycles of (⌫c)c2C consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2),
and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c
0
2), that violates C5. Note that {i1} = {i1, i2, i3} \ {j1, j2, j3}.
Case 1: i1 = j2 = i.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 j3 i
i i3 j1 j3
i2 i
Let R be a preference profile such that the preference orderings of students in {i, i2, , i3, j2, j3}
over their acceptable schools are as depicted below, and each other student finds no school
acceptable.
Ri Ri2 Ri3 Rj1 Rj3
c1 c1 c2 c01 c
0
2
c01 c2 c1 ; c01
c02 ; ; ;
Let µ be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {i, i2, , i3, j1, j3} are as
depicted above in boxes, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Let µ0 be the assignment where the assignments of the students in {i, i2, , i3, j2, j3} are as
underlined above, and each other student is assigned to his outside option.
Note that µ is the unique Pareto improvement over DA that is e cient and µ0 is an
e cient assignment. Moreover, BS(µ) = {i, j1} and BS(µ0) = {i}.
Case 2: i1 = j3 = i. This case is very similar to the previous case. We omit the detailed
arguments and just depict the priority and preference profiles that yield the desired conclusion.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 i j2
i i3 j1 i
i2 j2
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Ri Ri2 Ri3 Rj1 Rj3
c1 c1 c2 c01 c
0
1
c02 c2 c1 ; c02
c01 ; ; ;
;
Let µ be the boxed assignment and µ0 be the underlined assignment. Note that µ is the unique
Pareto improvement over DA that is e cient and µ0 is an e cient assignment. Moreover,
BS(µ) = {i, j1} and BS(µ0) = {i}.
Lemma 4 If a priority profile satisfies C4, and C5, then it also satisfies C2.
Proof. Suppose that ⌫ satisfies C4 and C5 but violates C2. Then, there are two Ergin-cycles
of (⌫c)c2C consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (j1, j2, j3), (c01, c02), that are distinct except for
the initiator. Let i1 = j1 ⌘ i.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 j3 j2
i i3 i j3
i2 j2
Consider the position of i in ⌫c02 . Observe that if i ⌫c02 j2 or j3 ⌫c02 i, then C5 is violated.
Thus, j2 ⌫c02 i ⌫c02 j3. Similarly, i2 ⌫c2 i ⌫c2 i3.
⌫c1 ⌫c2 ⌫c01 ⌫c02
i3 i2 j3 j2
i i i i
i2 i3 j2 j3
Now consider the position of j2 in ⌫c2 . Note that either j2 ⌫c2 i2 or i3 ⌫c2 j2, otherwise C4
is violated. Note that the same is true for j3 by similar arguments.
Suppose that j2 ⌫c2 i2. Consider the position of j3 in ⌫c2 . If j3 ⌫c2 j2, then C4 is violated:
consider the cycle consisting of (i, j3, j2) and (c02, c2). If j2 ⌫c2 j3 ⌫c2 i2, then C4 is violated:
consider the cycle consisting of (j3, i, j2) and (c2, c01). If i3 ⌫c2 j3, then C4 is violated: consider
the cycle consisting of (i3, j3, j2) and (c2, c01).
Note that we have exhausted all possible configurations, and every possible configuration
results in a contradiction.
(iii))(i): We will now show that C2, C3 and C4 are su cient for the EADA assignment to
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be BS-wise cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments. First, we define a
weakly tight generalized cycle.
We say that a list of students (1, . . . , n) and a list of schools (c1, . . . , cn 1) constitute a
weakly tight generalized cycle (of length n  1) if they constitute a generalized cycle and
I. there is no m 2 N \ {1, 2, . . . , n} and k 2 {2, . . . , n  1} such that k  ck m  ck k + 1
II. and there is no m 2 N \ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that n  c1 m  c1 2.
Because C3 is satisfied, Lemma 1 remains valid and there are no two distinct generalized
cycles.
Because C2 and C3 are satisfied, Lemma 2 remains valid and there are no two generalized
cycles that are distinct except for the initiator.
Because C2, C3 and C4 are satisfied, the proof of Lemma 3 shows that all generalized
cycles are weakly tight.
Lemma 5 If the priority profile satisfies C2, C3, and C4, then any weakly tight generalized
cycle is either tight or an Ergin-cycle (i.e. a cycle of length two).
Proof. Suppose that there is a weakly generalized cycle which is neither tight nor of length
two. Then there are a list of students (1, . . . , n) and a list of schools (c1, . . . , cn 1) (with
n  1 > 2) such that n  c1 1   c12 and for some k 2 {2, . . . , n  1}, k  ck 1  ck k + 1.
Also suppose that this a shortest instance and k < n   1 (as otherwise we relabel).
Consider n’s position in ⌫ck .
If k  ck 1  ck k + 1  ck n, then the generalized cycle consisting of (1, . . . , k, n) and
(c1, . . . , ck) is not weakly tight, a contradiction.
If n  ck k  ck 1  ck k + 1, then the generalized cycle consisting of (1, k + 1, . . . , n) and
(ck, . . . , cn) is not weakly tight, a contradiction.
If k  ck 1  ck n  ck k + 1, then the generalized cycle consisting of (1, . . . , k, n) and
(c1, . . . , ck) is a shorter instance where we have a weakly tight cycle which is not tight or of
length two, a contradiction.21
Thus, k  ck 1  ck n  ck k + 1. Analogous arguments (where k is in the role of n and c1
is in the role of ck) show n  c1 k  c1 1  c1 2. Consider k’s position in ⌫cn 1 .
21In case of n  1 = 3, one can also check that we have a contradiction to C4.
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If n   1  cn 1 k, then the generalized cycle consisting of (1, k + 1, . . . , n   1, k) and
(ck, . . . , cn) is not weakly tight, a contradiction.
If k  cn 1 n  1, then the generalized cycle consisting of (1, . . . , k, n) and (c1, . . . , ck 1, cn)
is not weakly tight, a contradiction.
But now Proposition 7 remains unchanged, and Proposition 8 shows that any assignment
obtained from the DA assignment by implementing an improvement cycle includes a unique







Another important property for the design of mechanisms is strategy-proofness: a mechanism
is strategy-proof if at any problem, no student can be better o↵ by reporting a preference
relation di↵erent than his true preference relation. Proposition 1 in Kesten (2010) shows
that there is no e cient and strategy-proof mechanism that selects the e cient and stable
assignment whenever it exists. Hence, there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof and
minimally unstable among e cient assignments for any of our stability comparisons based on
blocking pairs or blocking students. Even if the priority profile satisfies the conditions C1,
C2 and C3 and the EADA mechanism does not coincide with DA, the EADA mechanism is
not strategy-proof: this follows from Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009).
The top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003), which is
based on Gale’s TTC algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), is another well-known e cient
mechanism. The TTC mechanism is not a Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism,
but it is strategy-proof. The TTC mechanism is not minimally unstable among e cient
assignments simply because, TTC may not choose the e cient and stable assignment when
it exists. Yet, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020) has shown that, if we fix a set of agents and
a set of schools with unit capacities, then TTC is minimally unstable among e cient and
strategy-proof mechanisms. In our companion paper Doğan and Ehlers (2020), we show that
TTC is also minimally unstable among e cient and strategy-proof mechanisms for any of our
stability comparisons if we fix a set of agents and a set of schools with unit capacities.
Another known e cient mechanism is the top trading cycles over DA mechanism (DA TTC),
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which is based on applying Gale’s TTC procedure over the DA outcome, i.e., first run the DA
algorithm and obtain the DA assignment; then, using the DA assignment as the endowment
profile, calculate the TTC assignment as in Shapley and Scarf (1974). DA TTC mechanism
is e cient and Pareto improves over DA. DA TTC assignments are also not necessarily
minimally unstable among e cient assignments, since there exist problems where the EADA
assignment is more stable (see Example 8 in Kesten (2010)). Hence, DA TTC is also
not cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments, which also follows from our
Proposition 2.
Another alternative stability comparison is based on blocking triplets. Kwon and Shorrer
(2019) study the blocking triplets inclusion comparison (tincl) which is defined as follows
(given problem P and assignment µ): (i, j, c) 2 T (µ) if and only if i  c j, µ(j) = c, and
cPiµ(i); then for µ, ⌫ 2 A,
µ &Ptincl ⌫ , T (µ) ✓ T (⌫).
Now the blocking triplets cardinality comparison tcard is defined as follows. For each
P 2 P and µ, ⌫ 2 A,
µ &Ptcard ⌫ , |T (µ)|  |T (⌫)|.
Note that &Ptincl✓&Ptcard.
An immediate observation is that Theorem 1 extends to the blocking triplets cardinality
comparison tcard as for problems where schools have unit capacity, for any problem P we
have |B(µ)| = |T (µ)| for any e cient assignment µ. Hence, tcard and scard coincide on the
set of e cient assignments. The same is true for Proposition 2 and (ii) and (iii) of Proposition
3 as in the examples of the proofs all schools have unit capacities.22
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of (i) of Proposition 1
Proof. The following notation will be useful. Given a set of students I ✓ N and a set of
school S ✓ C, let µ(I) = [i2Iµ(i) and µ(S) = [c2Sµ(c) denote the aggregate assignments of
22Furthermore, (i) of Proposition 1 holds for tincl: let µ and ⌫ be two e cient assignments such that
µ &Ptincl ⌫; then T (µ) ✓ T (⌫); and for all (i, j, c) 2 T (µ) we have (a) (i, c) 2 B(µ) and (b) (i, j, c) 2 T (⌫) and
(i, c) 2 B(⌫). Since B(µ) = {(i, c) : (i, j, c) 2 T (µ) for some j 2 N} we obtain B(µ) ✓ B(⌫) and µ &Ppincl ⌫.
This and (i) of Proposition 1 imply that EADA(P ) is tincl-minimally unstable a.e.a. (which is also shown
by Kwon and Shorrer (2019) in Proposition 4).
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I and S at µ, respectively. Given a set of students I ✓ N , let µ|I denote the restriction of µ
to I. Note that µ|I is a mapping µ|I : I [ µ(I) ! I [ µ(I).
The following results from the literature will be useful. The following is Lemma 2 of Tang
and Yu (2014), which shows that each step of the EADA algorithm Pareto improves upon
the previous step.
Lemma 6 For each t 2 {2, . . . ,m}, µt Pareto improves µt 1. Also, µ1 Pareto improves the
DA assignment.
The following lemma follows from Doğan and Yenmez (2020), which shows that the EADA
satisfies a particular consistency property.
Lemma 7 Whenever a student, who is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at DA, is
removed with his assigned seat at the EADA assignment, the assignments of the remaining
students do not change when the EADA algorithm is run for the reduced problem.
The proof is in two steps. First, we prove the statement for problems at which each school
has unit capacity. Then, we extend it to the entire domain of problems.
Unit-capacity case: Let P = (N,C,R, q,⌫) be a problem such that for each c 2 C,
qc = 1. Let µ = EADA(P ). Let {I1, . . . , Im} denote the partition of N generated by
the underdemanded schools algorithm. Let ⌫ = DA(P ). For each t 2 {1, . . . ,m}, let
I>t = It+1 [ · · · [ Im (and similarly we define It and I<t). Let µ1, . . . , µm be as defined
above, i.e., for each t 2 {1, . . . ,m}, µt is the assignment obtained by iterating the EADA
algorithm for only t rounds.
We first claim that B(µ1) ✓ B(µ2) ✓ · · · ✓ B(µm) = B(µ). Note that for each
t 2 {1, . . . ,m  1}, µt+1 is a Pareto improvement over µt by Lemma 6. Then, for each school
c 2 C, the student who is assigned to c in µt+1 has a weakly lower priority than the student
who is assigned to c in µt, since otherwise µt restricted to I t would be unstable. Thus, for
each student i 2 It, the set of blocking pairs in µt that include i is a subset of the set of
the set of blocking pairs in µt+1 that include i. Moreover, since no student in I>t prefers a
school that is assigned to a student in It to his assigned school in µt+1, no student in I t+1
is included in a blocking pair in µt or µt+1, which proves the claim.
Suppose by contradiction that µ0 is an e cient assignment such that B(µ0) ( B(µ). Then,
for some j 2 N , µ0(j) 6= µ(j). Let j 2 It. If µ(It) = µ0(It), then by the underdemanded
schools algorithm, µ(i) = µt(i) for all i 2 It. But then Bi(µ) \ (It ⇥ µ(It)) = ; for all i 2 It.
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By B(µ0) ✓ B(µ), we also have Bi(µ0) \ (It ⇥ µ(It)) = ; for all i 2 It. Thus, both µ|It and
µ0|It are stable. Because µ(It) = µ0(It), it now follows from e ciency that µ(i) = µ0(i) for all
i 2 It, a contradiction to µ0(j) 6= µ(j) and j 2 It. Thus, µ(It) 6= µ0(It).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that µ0(j) /2 µ(It). But then going from µ to µ0 agent
j is involved in a trading cycle j1, . . . , jr such that µ0(jl) = µ(jl+1) for each l 2 {1, . . . , r  1},
and µ0(jr) = µ(j1). Let cl = µ(jl) for each l 2 {1, . . . , r}.
We show that there exists l 2 {1, . . . , r} such that jl 2 It, cl+1 2 µ(I>t), and cl+1Pjlcl. By
e ciency of µ0, there exists l 2 {1, . . . , r} such that cl+1Pjlcl. Then by the underdemanded
schools algorithm, cl+1 2 µ(I t). If cl+1 2 µ(I>t), then we have the desired l. Suppose
not, that is, suppose that cl+1 2 µ(It). Then we have µt(jl) = µ(jl) = cl and µt(jl+1) =
µ(jl+1) = cl+1 which implies jl+1  cl+1 jl. Since (jl+1, cl+1) /2 B(µ) and B(µ0) ✓ B(µ),
we have (jl+1, cl+1) /2 B(µ0) and cl+2 = µ0(jl+1)Pjl+1cl+1. But then again cl+2 2 µ(I t). If
cl+2 2 µ(I>t), we have the desired l. Otherwise, cl+2 2 µ(It). Since j 2 {j1, . . . , jr} and
µ0(j) /2 µ(It), continuing similarly we will eventually reach the desired l.
Now, without loss of generality, let j be such that j 2 It, µ0(j) 2 µ(I>t), and µ0(j)Pjµ(j).
Let i1 = µt(µ0(j)). Note that i1 2 I>t since µ0(j) 2 µ(I>t). By µ0(j)Pjµ(j), we have i1  µ0(j) j.
Thus, µ(i1)Ri1µ
0(j) and (i1, µ0(j)) /2 B(µ). By B(µ0) ✓ B(µ), (i1, µ0(j)) /2 B(µ0). Hence,
µ0(i1)Pi1µ
0(j) and since i1 2 I>t, by the underdemanded schools algorithm, µ0(i1) 2 µ(I>t).
Let i2 = µt(µ0(j)). By similar arguments, there exists an agent i3 such that i3 = µt(µ0(i2)),
µ0(i3) 2 µ(I>t), and µ0(i3)Pi3µ(i3). Continuing similarly, since the number of agents is
finite, we will eventually reach an agent ir such that j = µt(µ0(ir)), µ0(ir) 2 µ(I>t), and
µ0(ir)Pirµ(ir), which is a contradiction since µ
0(ir) = µ(j) and µ(j) 2 µ(It).
Extension to general capacities: Let P = (N,C,R, q,⌫) be a problem (not necessarily
unit-capacity). We construct an auxiliary unit-capacity problem P 0 = (N,C 0, R0, q0,⌫0),
which has the same set of students, as follows.
(i) For each c 2 C, we construct qc unit-capacity schools labelled as c1, . . . , cqc and assign
them into C 0. Note that |C 0| =
P
c2C qc and q
0 is a |C 0|-tuple of 1’s.
(ii) For each i 2 N and cp, c0q 2 C 0, we have cp R0i c0q if and only if c Pi c0 or [c = c0 and
p  q]. Also, cp Pi i if and only if c Pi i.
(iii) For each cp 2 C 0 and i, j 2 N , we have i ⌫0cp j if and only if i ⌫c j. Also, i ⌫cp cp if
and only if i ⌫c c.
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We define a mapping ' from the set of assignments in P 0 to the set of assignments in P
as follows. Given an assignment µ in problem P 0, let '(µ0) be the assignment in problem P
such that for each i 2 N , '(µ0)(i) = c if and only if µ0(i) = cp for some p 2 {1, . . . , cqc}.
Observation 1: '(DA(P 0)) = DA(P ). To see this, first note that clearly '(DA(P 0)) is
stable at P . Suppose that '(DA(P 0)) 6= DA(P ). Since DA(P ) is the student-optimal stable
assignment at P , DA(P ) Pareto improves '(DA(P 0)). Let µ be the assignment in problem
P 0 such that for each i 2 N , µ(i) = cp if and only if DA(P ) = c and |j 2 DA(c) : j ⌫c i| = p.
Note that µ is stable and Pareto improves DA(P 0) at P 0, which is a contradiction since
DA(P 0) is the student-optimal stable assignment at P 0.
Observation 2: Each student i 2 N who is assigned to an underdemanded school atDA(P 0)
is assigned to an underdemanded school also at DA(P ). (Note that it is not necessarily true
that if c 2 C is underdemanded at DA(P ), each of c1, . . . , cqc is underdemanded at DA(P 0).)
This easily follows from '(DA(P 0)) = DA(P ).
We show that '(EADA(P 0)) = EADA(P ). Let i1 2 N be a student who is assigned to
an underdemanded school cq at DA(P 0) (Since all the students who are assigned to a school
at the last step of the DA algorithm are assigned to underdemanded schools, there exists
such a student). By Observation 1, '(DA(P 0))(i1) = DA(P )(i) = c. By Observation 2, c is
underdemanded at DA(P ). Then, '(EADA(P 0))(i1) = EADA(P )(i1).
By Lemma 7, at the problem P 0, if student i1 is removed with his assigned seat at the
EADA(P 0) assignment, the assignments of the remaining students do not change when the
EADA algorithm is run for the reduced problem. Again by Lemma 7, at the problem P , if
student i is removed with his assigned seat at the EADA(P ) assignment, the assignments
of the remaining students do not change when the EADA algorithm is run for the reduced
problem.
Now, we proceed likewise with the reduced problems. Let i2 2 N \ {i1} be a student who
is assigned to an underdemanded school cq at the DA assignment for the problem reduced
from P 0 (As long as N \ {i1} 6= ;, there exists such a student). By similar arguments as
above, '(EADA(P 0))(i2) = EADA(P )(i2). Proceeding likewise, we will eventually exhaust
all the students, which concludes that '(EADA(P 0)) = EADA(P ).
Suppose that EADA(P ) is not minimally unstable among e cient assignments. Let
µ be an e cient assignment that is more stable than EADA(P ) at P . Let µ0 be the
assignment in problem P 0 such that for each i 2 N , µ(i) = cp if and only if DA(P ) = c and
|j 2 DA(c) : j ⌫c i| = p. Note that µ0 is e cient and more stable than EADA(P 0), which is
a contraction since the EADA assignment is minimally unstable among e cient assignments
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when each school has unit capacity.
A.2 Necessary Conditions in the Multi-Capacity Case
A capacity-priority profile (qc,⌫c)c2C includes an (multi-capacity) Ergin-cycle (Ergin, 2002)
if there exist a list of three students (i1, i2, i3), a pair of schools (c1, c2), and a pair of (possibly
empty) disjoint sets of students (Nc1 , Nc2) such that such that i3  c1 i1  c1 i2 and i2  c2 i3.
i. i3  c1 i1  c1 i2 and i2  c2 i3,
ii. for each t 2 {1, 2}, Nct ⇢ N \ {1, 2, 3} and |Nct | = qct   1,
iii. Nc1 ⇢ {i 2 N : i  ct 1} and Nc2 ⇢ {i 2 N : i  c2 3}.
Given an Ergin-cycle consisting of (1, 2, 3), (c1, c2), and (Nc1 , Nc2), we call the first student,
student 1, as the initiator of the Ergin-cycle.
Given an Ergin-cycle consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (Nc1 , Nc2), and another Ergin-





, N 0c02), we say that the two generalized cycles
are distinct if all the students, schools, and sets of students in the two generalized cycles are
distinct; we say that the two generalized cycles are distinct except for the initiator if
i1 = j1 and all the other students, schools, and sets of students in the two generalized cycles
are distinct.
We say that a list (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (Nc1 , Nc2) constitute a tight Ergin-cycle if they
constitute an Ergin-cycle and
iv. there is no m 2 N \ {2, 3} such that 2  c2 m  c2 3
v. and there is no m 2 N \ {1, 2, 3} such that 3  c1 m  c1 2.
Condition C1*: All the Ergin-cycles are tight.
Condition C2*: There are no two Ergin-cycles that are distinct except for the initiator.
Condition C3*: For any two Ergin-cycles consisting of (i1, i2, i3), (c1, c2), and (Nc1 , Nc2),





, N 0c02), there does not exist any student i 2 {i1, i2, i3},
any school c 2 C \ {c1, c2, c01, c02} and any set of students Nc distinct from the students
in the two Ergin-cycles (including the sets of students in the two Ergin-cycles) such that
Nc ⇢ {j 2 N : j  c i} and |Nc| = qc   1.
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Proposition 10 Suppose that (qc,⌫c)c2C violates Condition C1*, i.e., it includes an Ergin-
cycle that is not tight. Then, there exists a problem such that there is no Pareto improvement
over DA which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. Follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4 with the following
modifications.
- In the preference profile R, for each t 2 {1, 2}, each student in Nct top ranks ct.
- In the assignments µ and µ0, for each t 2 {1, 2}, each student in Nct is assigned to ct.
Proposition 11 Suppose that (qc,⌫c)c2C violates Condition C2*, i.e., it includes two Ergin-
cycles that are distinct except for the initiator. Then, there exists a problem such that there
is no Pareto improvement over DA which is cardinally minimally unstable among e cient
assignments.
Proof. Follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5 with the following
modifications.
- In the preference profile R, for each t 2 {1, 2}, each student in Nct top ranks ct and each
student in N 0c0t top ranks c
0
t.
- In the assignments µ and µ0, for each t 2 {1, 2}, each student in Nct is assigned to ct
and each student in N 0c0t is assigned to c
0
t.
Proposition 12 Suppose that (qc,⌫c)c2C violates Condition C3*. Then, there exists a
problem such that there is no Pareto improvement over DA which is cardinally minimally
unstable among e cient assignments.
Proof. Follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 6 with the following
modifications.
- Note that in the proof of Proposition 6, existence of a school c with the desired property
follows from the unit-capacity assumption and the assumption that |C|   5. Here, it directly
follows from the violation of C3*.
- In the preference profile R, each student in Nc top ranks c and for each t 2 {1, 2}, each




- In the assignments µ and µ0, each student in Nc is assigned to c and for each t 2 {1, 2},
each student in Nct is assigned to ct and each student in N
0
c0t
is assigned to c0t.
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